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Abstract
During the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Communist Party of China (CPC) 
Congress, a new and important reform document was adopted. Announcing 
reforms mainly in the juridical sector, the 'Decision of the CPC Central Commit-
tee Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing 
the Country According to the Law Forward' is part of the overall reform pack-
age kicked off at the Third Plenum last year. This article points out the docu-
ment's main objectives, and provides a preliminary analysis of the announced 
reforms. Three main themes are identiﬁed. First, the document is part of the 
overall goal of developing a special Chinese system of 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics'. Second, not only institutions but also the minds and work styles 
of ofﬁcials are to be reformed. Third, the document strongly afﬁrms the CPC's 
role as the legal guardian of the reform process, as well as juridical matters.
From October 20–23, 2014, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) met for its fourth plenary session and passed a 
major document titled 'Decision of the CPC Central Committee Concern-
ing Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the 
Country According to the Law Forward' (hereafter: Decision) (Xinhua 
2014a), which was drafted by a group headed by President Xi Jinping. Xi 
had also served as chair of the group that drafted the landmark 'Decision 
of the CPC Central Committee on Some Important Questions Concern-
ing Comprehensively Deepening Reform' adopted by the Third Plenary 
Session in November 2013 (Xinhua 2013; Brødsgaard and Grünberg 2014). 
Whereas the earlier decision from November 2013 focused on economic, 
political and social reform policies, the more recent one sets out the direc-
tion for a number of initiatives and reforms in legal matters.
It is telling that Xi also was head of the drafting group of the new Cen-
tral Committee document. He has now been in power for two years, and 
during this relatively short period of time he has managed to consolidate 
his power considerably. He is not only General Secretary of the CPC, 
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President of the PRC and head of the Central Military Commission, he 
is also head of a number of small leading groups as well as new agencies 
such as the National Security Council and the National Reform Group. In 
terms of policy making he is exercising increasing inﬂuence by heading 
these important Party groups charged with the formulation of strategic 
policy proposals and directions. This article gives a preliminary analysis 
of the recent Decision adopted at the Fourth Plenum, identifying three 
main objectives of the document. First, the Decision ties into the overall 
goal of building a speciﬁcally Chinese system of 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics', by pushing relevant reforms of institutions and norms 
within the juridical system. These reforms should not be seen isolated, 
but as parts of a quite comprehensive attempt at reforming the Party-
state as such. Second, the document sets out not only to reform formal 
institutions, but also the minds of both ofﬁcials and the public. Numer-
ous initiatives aim at promoting a 'rule of law culture', rooted in virtue, 
morality and responsibility. The third objective is a strong conﬁrmation 
of the role of the CPC as the legal guardian of the constitution. This in-
cludes the recentralization of authority, especially at the province level, 
and the afﬁrmation of the principle of top-down supervision.
Usually, the meetings of the central committee in between Party 
congresses follow a certain pattern. The first plenary session held im-
mediately after the conclusion of a national Party congress elects the 
Politburo, its standing committee as well as the new general secretary. 
The second plenary session discusses and nominates new members of 
the country's next government. The third plenary session decides on the 
direction and principles of economic development during the first tenure 
of the new leadership. The fifth plenary session usually discusses the 
five-year plans, which subsequently are passed by the National People's 
Congress during its spring session. The sixth plenary session is often 
devoted to the cultural systems and cultural values covered by concepts 
such as harmonious society. The seventh plenary session is normally held 
one week before the national Party congress and lays the groundwork 
for the event, including the new leadership line-up. 
The fourth plenary session usually focuses on Party building. However, 
this year, law and legal work took centre stage, extending the reform 
work initiated in 2013 into these issue areas. The current anti-corruption 
campaign has also made new directions in this area an urgent matter.
Revolving around the establishment of rule of law in China, or 
more precisely, a 'socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics', 
the Decision is an important continuation and extension of the Xi ad-
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ministration's general reform programme into the juridical workings 
of the Party-state. While not as comprehensive and ambitious as the 
decisions issued after the third plenum last year, this recent document is 
important in showing how the CPC intends to use the juridical system 
in the general push to revitalize and strengthen the CPC's governance 
of the Party-state. The increased official use of the term yifa zhiguo 
(which can be translated as 'ruling the country according to law' or 
simplified, 'rule by law') over the last weeks, has puzzled many ob-
servers as to what exactly is meant by it, and how it compares to the 
Western notion of 'rule of law' (e.g. Huang 2014; Minzer 2014). The 
Fourth Plenum has given a number of indications about the precise 
meaning and consequences for the institutional structure. While some 
important and concrete reforms have been announced in the juridical 
system, large parts of the document serve the ongoing formulation of a 
consistent institutional logic throughout the system in both theory and 
practice. The core objective supported by the Decision is stated as the 
'construction of a socialist rule of law system with Chinese character-
istics, and the construction of a socialist rule of law country'. It is not 
about introducing a Western-style rule of law. China, in this as in so 
many other areas, will follow its own way.
Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics
The precise meaning of the Chinese term yifa zhiguo has been discussed 
widely in the media, especially regarding the role of the CPC in the 
juridical system. Already in 2013, at the 30th anniversary of the imple-
mentation of the Chinese constitution on 4 December, Xi Jinping gave 
a speech on the 'rule in accord with the constitution' (yixian zhiguo). In 
retrospect, this seemed to be an early sign of Xi's intended reforms in 
the Party-state's juridical institutions. The Decision has now outlined in 
more detail how China's 'rule of law' is deﬁned, and links the outlined 
reforms in the juridical system to the general reform programme an-
nounced at the third plenum last year. Moreover, it adds more detail to 
the theoretical conception of the Party-state as 'socialism with Chinese 
characteristics', clarifying—or more precisely conﬁrming—the relation-
ships between the CPC, the constitution and the juridical system.
This means that the Party will deﬁne the law and the Chinese con-
stitutional order. It also means that the Party will continue to have its 
own institutions, rules and practices, which at times will take priority 
over state laws and regulations (Clarke 2014). Institutions such as po-
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litical legal committees, Party cells in courts, and Party control over the 
nomenklatura will persist. Practices such as detaining Party members 
for long periods of investigation (shuanggui) as well as Party review of 
major National People's Congress (NPC) legislation will also continue 
(Article 2, Section 2).  
According to the Decision, the leadership of the CPC is a necessary 
precondition for rule according to the law and the constitution, since 
'…Party leadership and socialist rule of law are identical, socialist rule 
of law must persist in Party leadership, and Party leadership must rely 
on socialist rule of law' (Article 1). The '…implementation of leadership 
of the CPC in all processes and aspects of ruling the country accord-
ing to law' is thus an effort to establish a 'socialist rule of law system' 
(Article 1). The term 'socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics' 
must also be seen as a conﬁrmation of the notion of China as a system 
of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Having set the legal (and 
conceptual) norms, conﬁrming and reiterating the CPC's mandate of 
representing the highest authority, the document goes on with a few 
principles on equality before the law, the dominant position of the Peo-
ple, and a necessary rootedness of socialism with Chinese characteristics 
in the 'Chinese reality' (Article 1), before continuing with more concrete 
reforms in the juridical system. 
Interestingly, the Decision also demands that newly elected and ap-
pointed People's Congress ofﬁcials at all levels pledge allegiance to the 
Constitution of China. This oath is not demanded from Party cadres, 
according to the Decision, since they already swear an oath to the Par-
ty's own constitution. Moreover, the 4th of December is designated 
as 'Constitution Day', promoting general education and awareness of 
the constitution as the 'basic law' (Article 2, Section 1). The work style 
of ofﬁcials is to be changed into one of 'ruling according to law' and 
'ruling according to virtue' (Article 1). The introduction of virtue into 
the legal framework may seem odd, yet it corresponds with the goal of 
establishing a speciﬁcally Chinese system, building on Chinese morals 
and values, emphasizing education and cultivation. These aspects are 
strongly promoted in other political initiatives, such as the 'Chinese 
Dream', the strong anti-corruption efforts, and many other reform 
packages following the third plenum last year. Supported by a strong 
propaganda apparatus under Liu Yunshan, this attempt to reform not 
only institutions, but also the minds of ofﬁcials and cadres through 
education campaigns (such as the mass line), appears to be an important 
part of the reform push under the Xi administration.
126 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 32(2)•2014
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Nis Grünberg ______________________________________
Legal System Reforms
While the establishment of the socialist rule of law with Chinese charac-
teristics is a central part of the document, important and more concrete 
reforms are also mentioned. The Decision clearly acknowledges a broad 
number of problems in the juridical system, including corruption, poor 
or selective law enforcement, procedural roadblocks, turf battles among 
constituencies and departmentalization (Article 1). 
Corruption, abuse of ofﬁce and administrative authority, and viola-
tion of procedures in handling such cases, are mentioned several times. 
Clariﬁcation of duties, a system of governmental authority lists, and 
a general consolidation of authorities (e.g. a reduction of types of law 
enforcement teams at the lower levels) aim at a more coherent, trans-
parent system. Interference by all Party or state authorities, including 
leading cadres, in juridical activities is prohibited (Article 4, Section 
1), and the supervision of higher-level bodies over such activity is to 
be strengthened (Article 3, Section 5). This is an important statement, 
since local protectionism, and the authority local governments have 
over judges, have led to many problems in the past. What is missing 
though, are concrete institutional mechanisms actually ensuring that 
these reforms will be followed through, and the language used is one 
of 'perfecting systems', 'persist in principles', 'strengthen restraints and 
deepen reforms'. This does not mean they are toothless, but they follow 
a common pattern in the type of strategic policy documents that rarely 
spell out in detail exactly what has to be done at local levels, focusing 
on the ends rather than the means. 
Another important announcement is the establishment of circuit 
courts under the Supreme Court, which are to be held where multiple 
jurisdictions (e.g. provinces) are involved in cases (Article 4, Section 
2). This is an important reform, since cross-administrative cases have 
been very difﬁcult to handle in the Chinese system, where fragmented 
authorities often hamper the resolution of disputes and questions of 
jurisdiction and accountability. 
Changes have also been announced in the case ﬁling system, likely 
making it harder for courts (and governments/ofﬁcials) to reject cases. 
Especially cases ﬁled concerning abuse of power and corruption are of-
ten suppressed, and the Decision introduces a 'case registration system', 
which possibly makes it harder for courts to not register cases (Article 4, 
Section 2). It is not clariﬁed how this system will work speciﬁcally, but 
if implemented together with calls for more transparency and openness 
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(Article 4, Section 4), it could introduce important mechanisms for better 
public access to legal protection against abuses of power.
Finally, grass-roots governance systems are to be reformed, including 
the establishment of a 'community correction law', and the strengthening 
of grass-roots Party groups (Article 2, Section 4). Moreover, the Deci-
sion calls for increased legal education and 'legal popularization' (pu fa) 
(Article 5, Section 1), increased 'consciousness of rule of law governance' 
among grass-roots cadres, as well as legal education of the population 
in general, through tertiary education, textbooks and legal research 
(Article 6, Section 3). 
Another Round of 'Soft Centralization'?
A generally observable trend under Xi Jinping, has been a 'soft centraliza-
tion' of authority, now including a number of important mechanisms in 
the legal system. Prime examples are the career management of judges, 
which is moved to the provincial level, but also the increased auditing 
and supervision authority handed to department/provincial level Party 
and state organs. Capacities of the 'central government's macro-level 
management' are to be increased, and the top-down supervision of 
higher-level bodies over lower-level bodies is reconﬁrmed as an im-
portant principle (Article 3, Section 1). An especially important reform 
is the centralization of auditing and personnel issues at the provincial 
level, such as the selection of judges and prosecutors. Their appointment 
will now be overseen by provincial-level courts, which are to establish 
a selection system based on their performance at lower levels (Article 
6, Section 1). This is important, since judges and prosecutors now will 
have to work their way up through the system, being reviewed by courts 
on higher levels and largely beyond the control of the government of 
the level they work at. This is supported by another point, stating that 
judges can only be removed or suspended based on unlawful action (as 
opposed to the sole decision by powerful individuals or government 
organs) (Article 4, Section 1). 
These reforms are meant to give courts more independence, es-
pecially from local governments' interference, as well as creating a 
more performance-based career path for judges, more aligned to the 
civil service system. What is not mentioned, however, is the potential 
discretionary power of the CPC in the appointment of judges, or in all 
other matters if seen necessary. This will not change; in fact, it may be 
strengthened, since the general role of the Party as the legal guardian 
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of the Constitution and the watchman of the juridical process has been 
clearly conﬁrmed as well. Checks and balances are the normative values 
richly added to the Decision, demanding cadres and authorities always 
act responsibly and abide by the law, rule according to 'virtue' (Article 
1), establish a 'rule of law consciousness' throughout society (Article 5, 
Section 1) and only interfere when it is required to prevent unlawful 
action within the system.
Drafting the Decision
Drafting major Chinese documents is a protracted process. According 
to Xi Jinping's own lengthy explanation of the background and content 
of the Decision, work on the document started in January of this year 
when the Politburo decided that the focus of the Fourth Plenum would 
be discussing how to 'move the country according to the law forward' 
(Xinhua 2014b). A drafting group was formed with Xi as head and NPC 
chairman Zhang Dejiang and Central Discipline Inspection Commission 
(CDIC) chairman Wang Qishan as deputy heads. In addition, about 
70 leading ofﬁcials from relevant departments including 'provincial 
leading comrades' participated. On 27 January, the Party centre issued 
a notice soliciting opinions on questions pertaining to the theme of the 
upcoming plenum. On 12 February, the drafting group held its ﬁrst 
meeting. During the following eight months the standing committee 
convened three meetings and the full Politburo two meetings to discuss 
the drafting process. Xi Jinping disclosed that the drafting group also 
had solicited the opinions of old Party leaders (Xinhua 2014b). Thus, 
although the drafting process is controlled by Xi Jinping, he is careful 
to aim for a consensus among current and former Party leaders.
Corruption Campaign
The promulgation of the Decision is not only part of the reform process 
resumed at the third plenary session in 2012, it should also be seen in 
the context of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. This campaign 
started immediately after Xi Jinping took over in November 2012. It has 
now been going on for two years and there are no signs that it will end 
any time soon. On the contrary, Wang Qishan, the head of the Central 
Disciplinary Committee, has said that the campaign will last for a long 
time. So far, the result has been the investigation of thousands of ofﬁcials, 
many of whom have been expelled from the Party for corruption and 
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subsequently handed over to the ofﬁcial courts for further prosecution. 
The campaign has not only targeted lower-level ofﬁcials, but also an un-
precedented number of ofﬁcials at the vice-ministerial-level and above. 
In fact, more than 30 of these 'tigers' have been investigated and detained 
(Chen 2014). Among them are state-level leaders such as former member 
of the standing committee of the Politburo, Zhong Yongkang, and former 
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Caihou.
While member of the standing committee of the Politburo, Zhou Yong-
kang was head of the political-legal commission and thereby in charge 
of domestic security and maintenance of order. This included the police 
force, the courts and the procuratorate. Apparently, unprecedented 
spending induced rampant corruption and malfeasance in the legal and 
security departments. Li Dongsheng, vice-minister of Public Security 
and Liang Ke, director of the Beijing Municipal Bureau of State Security, 
are examples of high-level ofﬁcials who have been taken into custody 
for corruption. The police, state security, armed civil militia, courts and 
jails have now been placed under the command of the newly established 
National Security Commission headed by Xi Jinping. It is clear that the 
Party has felt a need to follow up on these administrative measures by 
calling for a strengthening of the legal basis and framework.
Associated with the anti-corruption campaign is an extra-extrava-
gance campaign, which has also been ongoing since the end of 2012. 
In December 2012, Xi Jinping announced the so-called Eight Directives 
(baxiang guiding) to curb red tape and extravagance, and in December 
2013, the Party circulated the so-called Six Injunctions (liuxiang jinling) 
to limit receptions, travelling, banquets and all forms of gift giving. The 
Decision reiterates these limits on public spending by ofﬁcials in order to 
put an end to the pervasive abuse of power and the distortion of rules 
for personal gain and for the beneﬁt of friends and family.
Conclusion
The amount of text in the Decision spent on the clariﬁcation and for-
mulation of the establishment of the socialist rule of law system, and 
the CPC's role as the leading authority in the process, indicates how 
important the reform of the Party and the legal system is for the current 
leadership. It is also a reﬂection of the consistent logic of the reform 
programme under Xi, where institutional development and reform are 
driven and deﬁned by the central role of the CPC. The development and 
strengthening of socialism with Chinese characteristics as a distinctively 
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Chinese system seems to be the key goal of the Decision. In this sense, 
the document forms an important addition to the conceptual foundation 
for the CPC and its leadership of the Party-state. Thus, it supplements 
the policy goals formulated at the third plenary session last year. More 
policy documents covering other areas of the economic-political-social 
system can be expected as the new leadership with Xi Jinping in the 
driver's seat consolidates its power. 
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